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The Modern Transformation of Civil Law
GEORGE L. PRIESTt
This Essay addresses the transformation of civil law
that began in this country, roughly around the mid-1960s,
from a legal system that intervened in the lives of citizens
only on occasions of serious moral dereliction, to the most
extensive and powerful regulatory mechanism of modern
society.' Prior to the 1960s, civil law served a modest role in
U.S. affairs. It enforced property rights and policed
boundary disputes through property law, enforced promises
as well as disclaimers of liability through contract law, and
provided damages for personal injury through negligence
law (tort law) when an individual was injured by an
egregious breach of standards of normal behavior. Though
the negligence standard proved loose enough to allow
substantial subsequent expansion, courts prior to the 1960s
employed this standard only where a party showed clear
moral culpability that was substantially antagonistic to
social norms. Standards determined by private contract
t John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School; Associate
Professor of Law, State University of New York, Buffalo Law School, 1977-79.
1. This Essay draws variously from earlier writings. See generally, George
L. Priest, The Culture of Modern Tort Law, 34 VAL. L. REV. 573 (2000); George
L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)
[hereinafter Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability]; George L. Priest, The New
Legal Structure of Risk Control, 119 DAEDALUS 207 (1990); George L. Priest,
Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301 (1989)
[hereinafter Priest, Strict Products Liability]. An earlier version of this Essay
was presented at a Common Good Conference, Lawsuits and Liberty in 2005.
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were far more significant to the determination of the
obligations of citizens.
Since the 1960s, however, our civil law has changed
dramatically. Contract law, property law, and especially
personal injury law have transformed both in function and
effect. The transformation occurred through neither a
sudden change in legal doctrine, nor legislative statute or
popular referendum. Instead, the transformation occurred
through the triumph of a set of ideas: the acceptance by the
judiciary of the proposition that civil damages judgments
can serve as the most effective public policy instrument for
regulating the level of harm suffered by citizens in the
society.
It is surely not coincidental that the outset of this
transformation of civil law was roughly contemporaneous
with the creation of various federal regulatory agencies
charged with controlling levels of harm, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (created in 1970), the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1970), the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (1971) and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (1972). In many
respects, however, the transformation of civil law developed
in ways that gave it a far more ambitious and extensive
regulatory authority than any of these agencies. All
regulatory agencies have limited budgets and, as a
consequence, are constrained to thresholds of concern.
Thus, even agencies with broad authority-such as OSHA
or EPA-can effectively regulate the decisions of only a
limited number of corporations. Other regulatory
agencies-such as NHTSA-possess jurisdiction over only a
single industry (auto manufacture).
Our modern civil justice system, in contrast, aspires to
regulate the sources of harm with respect to all activities of
the society. Our civil courts can entertain the question of
whether a victim should receive compensation from the
party that caused it harm as long as it is economically
worthwhile for a person feeling victimized to initiate
litigation; all such claims will be entertained. Indeed, to
perfect the system, the incentives for initiating litigation
themselves have been enhanced by various statutes
awarding attorneys' fees and shifting litigation costs, as
well as expansive notions of "harm"-for example, awarding
damages for medical monitoring to individuals who only
suspect or fear they have been harmed. As a result, our
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courts today employ civil damage judgments to regulate all
activities implicating harm within every industry, and
indeed, by every citizen. Through the daily aggregation of
civil damage judgments (or the settlement of lawsuits
informed by expected judgments), our courts provide fine-
tuned control of all societal behavior.
How did this transformation of civil law come about?2
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the basic
doctrines of civil law remained generally stable. Yet, there
was serious debate in the legal academy, as well as in the
public policy community generally, over the role of civil law
with respect to harms suffered in society. An important
initial step in the transformation of civil law occurred in the
early years of the twentieth century when civil law was
abandoned as a mechanism for dealing with injuries
suffered by workers during the course of employment. The
adoption by state legislatures of worker compensation
statutes during the period, roughly 1907-1915, creating
mandatory employer insurance programs, represented the
rejection of both tort law and contract law as means of
regulating the sources of worker injuries.
Prior to the establishment of workers' compensation
insurance, injured workers could seek recovery against
their employers in tort law where they could show employer
negligence as a cause of the injury. Employers could defend
such claims, however, by showing that the worker had been
contributorily negligent, that the worker had assumed the
risk of injury, or that the worker's injury resulted from the
negligence of a fellow worker, according to what is called
the "fellow-servant doctrine." Workers could sue their fellow
workers for negligence, but recovery was not likely to be
substantial, given workers' limited resources. Thus, it
became widely accepted that tort law was largely ineffective
in providing recovery to injured workers, and tort law was
rejected as a mechanism for recovery. In its place, workers'
compensation statutes compelled employers to provide
insurance for worker injuries and, at the same time,
prohibited workers from suing employers in tort.
2. For a more thorough account of this history, see generally Priest,
Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 1; Priest, Strict Products Liability,
supra note 1.
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Though somewhat less sharply, workers' compensation
insurance also represented a rejection of contract law as a
mechanism for dealing with injuries. Few believed that
workers, individually, were able to negotiate safer working
conditions, and only a small portion of the working class
was unionized. In addition, the concept of compensating
wage differentials was not widely understood. Contract law,
therefore, was not viewed as an answer. To the contrary,
employer-provided insurance was necessary if workers were
to receive compensation for injuries.
Besides serving the ambition of increasing payments to
injured workers, workers' compensation insurance came to
be justified by a concept that derived from economics: the
concept of internalizing costs. 3 According to this concept, if
a party engaging in some activity fails to take into account
the full costs that the activity generates, the party is likely
to engage in more of the activity than is appropriate for the
society. Where the costs are injury costs, there will result
higher levels of injurious activities and thus larger numbers
of injuries than societally appropriate. If, however, injury
costs are internalized-if the injurer must pay the costs of
the injury-the party causing the harm will be led to
prevent losses where possible and to readjust its activity
level to reduce the aggregate number of injuries.
Compelling employers to provide insurance for all injuries
suffered by workers during the course of employment serves
to internalize the costs of worker injuries to employers. 4
The adoption of workers' compensation programs was
widely praised in the legal academy. Indeed, some
academics thought the concept so meritorious that they
sought to extend such insurance programs more broadly, to
provide compensation for all injuries suffered in society.
3. See A. C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1st ed., Macmillan and Co.
1920); A. C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1st ed., Macmillan and Co. 1912).
4. By contrast, failing to compensate workers for their injuries, say, by
enforcement of the common law tort defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, or the fellow-servant doctrine, serves to internalize worker
injury costs to the workers themselves. Many years later, Ronald Coase would
show that, with respect to activity levels, internalizing injury costs to workers
will have economic effects equivalent to internalizing those costs to employers.
See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). This
profound idea, however, remains foreign to the debate today.
2006] TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL LAW 961
Fleming James was a prominent promoter of this idea. 5 The
ambition of James and others to have enacted general
societal accident insurance, however, never found success.
First, a general social insurance program is, basically,
socialism, to which there was deep political opposition.
Even during the New Deal, insurance programs were
established only with respect to particular risks-such as
crop insurance, savings and loan insurance, and Social
Security.6 Second, general social insurance is, at heart,
inconsistent with the internalizing costs rationale. General
social insurance is not self-contained as is insurance for
workplace injuries. To provide general insurance for
injuries does not serve to internalize costs to the specific
activities that generated the injuries. General social
insurance would provide compensation to injured parties-
sufficient grounds for support to James and others-but it
would not serve to create incentives for reducing the
accident rate.
Faced with the failure of their social insurance
proposals, and with no serious prospect of future success,
many academics pressed for the expansion of civil law as a
means of providing broader compensation to injured
parties. James, again, was the most prominent toward this
end. In a set of roughly fifty articles, James urged the
expansion of tort liability in all of its forms and the
restriction of available defenses, moving toward a standard
of absolute liability.
For many years, James' advocacy had little effect. An
opening wedge appeared, however, in the early 1960s with
regard to the subject of manufacturer liability. Until the
1960s, recovery for injuries resulting from product use was
chiefly determined by contract law. Contract law allowed
the specific purchaser of the product to recover according to
the terms of the express product warranty or of the implied
warranty of merchantability. Recovery was available to the
specific purchaser and, generally, only to the specific
purchaser, because that person was the only party to the
contract of sale (privity of contract). Virtually all product
5. See Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, for a more
detailed description of James' work.
6. Franklin Roosevelt justified Social Security as providing protection for
the "risk of old age."
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warranties at the time, however, disclaimed liability for any
personal injury associated with use of the product. 7 Thus,
according to contract law and the terms of product
contracts, there was no recovery for personal injury.
There had been some concern about the operation of
these contract doctrines prior to the 1960s, but it remained
chiefly academic. Some jurisdictions recognized an action in
negligence by a victim not a party to the contract.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,8 decided in 1916, extended
negligence liability only to manufacturers of products
regarded as "imminently dangerous," and only where it
could be shown that the purchaser or an intermediate
dealer would not inspect the product for defects. Over the
four decades that followed MacPherson, some jurisdictions
extended the scope of the negligence doctrine, in particular,
to cases involving spoiled food, although the jurisdictions
were far from unanimous. Thus, through the late 1950s and
early 1960s, defective product cases were controlled by
contract law with its privity requirement and, to a
substantially lesser extent, by negligence law.
This changed dramatically, however, in the early 1960s
and 1970s, beginning in the then-limited field of product
liability. In my judgment, there were two conceptual forces
leading to this change. The first was the delegitimation of
contract law-in particular, warranty law-as a means for
dealing with product injuries. The second was the growing
belief that the expansion of tort liability in the context of
personal injuries could have beneficial effects for society.
The delegitimation of contract law followed from the
work of another law professor, Friedrich Kessler. 9 Kessler
was a German scholar who had fled the Hitler regime to the
United States. Kessler had no specific interest in product-
related injuries. His attack on contract law was far more
7. The central warranty remedy then (as now) was repair and replacement
if a product were found to be defective. There are good economic reasons for
manufacturers to disclaim liability for personal injury--chiefly because
manufacturer-provided insurance is a very poor insurance mechanism-though
these reasons were never articulated at the time. See generally George L. Priest,
A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
8. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
9. See generally Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, for a
more detailed description of Kessler's work.
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expansive. Kessler believed that fundamental changes had
occurred in the character of Western economies that deeply
threatened democratic societies and the individual
freedoms achieved in modern times. Kessler attributed
these social changes to the "decline of the free market
system,"10 which he saw as a consequence of "the innate
trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly."11
Kessler's criticism of the capitalistic world was quite
pointed. He described the modern industrial culture as a
form of fascism: "the rise of fascism in our industrial world
has made us realize that democratic freedom is not
inevitable."'12 According to Kessler, single firms were able
"to control and regulate the distribution of goods from
producer all the way down to the ultimate consumer. '"13
Quite curiously, Kessler saw the principal mechanism
for this new means of fascist control to be contract law. The
formation of large "industrial empires" had been made
possible by contracts, and standardized contracts in
particular. 14 Standardized contracts-such as insurance
policies or consumer product warranties-were to Kessler
the equivalent of the forms of bondage typical of the feudal
era. According to Kessler, "[s]tandard contracts could ...
become effective instruments in the hands of powerful
industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to
impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast
host of vassals."' 5
Kessler's most influential article with respect to the
transformation of modern civil law is the classic Contracts
of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract.
The article presents a moral narrative that contrasts the
ancient to the modern, the good to the evil, the redeemable
to the unredeemable, that possesses a persuasive power
that continues to command acceptance today. Kessler
10. Friedrich Kessler, Natural Law, Justice and Democracy-Some
Reflections on Three Types of Thinking About Law and Justice, 19 TUL. L. REV.
32, 33 (1944).
11. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
12. Kessler, supra note 10, at 33.
13. Kessler, supra note 11, at 632.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 640.
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contrasts a "society of small enterprisers, individual
merchants and independent craftsmen" for whom
nineteenth century contract law was designed, with large-
scale enterprise and monopoly capitalism characteristic of
modern times. 16 Freedom of contract may have had
meaning in the earlier world. Today, however, the
prototypical modern contract is a standardized form
employed by enterprises with strong bargaining power
against weaker parties--consumers-in need of necessary
goods and services. Modern contracts are contracts of
adhesion that consumers must take or leave without ever
understanding their terms at all. In this context, the
enforcement of contract terms according to the principle of
freedom of contract serves only to protect "the unequal
distribution of property."17
The second principal conceptual force toward the
transformation of civil law was the insistence by James and
others that an expansion of tort liability would
substantially improve social welfare. James, as mentioned,
was principally concerned with providing compensation to
injured parties. He supported general social insurance and,
in its absence, the expansion of tort liability to achieve that
end. His ambition was valuably aided by judicial opinions
that focused more sharply on the positive societal gains
from expanded tort liability.
Judicial acceptance of the broader role of tort law
toward these ends first appeared in 1944 in California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor's concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.18 Traynor's opinion sets
forth the grounds for the strict liability standard for product
defects that was later adopted by the California Supreme
Court and virtually all other states. The case was simple. A
waitress at a restaurant was moving some bottles of soda
pop when one of them exploded, injuring her. (The context
of the incident was never made clear. The California
Supreme Court, and Traynor, approached the issue as if the
bottle exploded spontaneously. Whether the waitress
dropped the bottle, hit the bottle against something, or
stumbled and fell was not present before the Court.) The
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
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majority of the California Supreme Court also found the
case simple: they invoked the tort doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur (roughly, the event speaks for itself) to hold that,
despite the terms of any contractual arrangement between
the distributor and the restaurant (in fact, the Court did
not even discuss the contractual arrangement), the
manufacturer should be liable because Coke bottles should
not explode.
Justice Traynor's concurrence was subtler and more
policy oriented. He concurred with the Court's finding of
liability, but provided deeper grounds for the
appropriateness of shifting the costs of the waitress's injury
to Coca-Cola. Traynor embraced a theory of strict liability
in tort of the manufacturer. Strict liability was to be
distinguished from negligence liability-in which the victim
has to show that the defendant committed some negligent
act. Traynor analogized the strict liability standard to the
standard of res ipsa loquitur: if there is something defective
with respect to the product, the manufacturer is to blame.
That analogy-important as it was for many courts in the
future-was not Traynor's principal point. Traynor argued
that there were important social grounds to extend liability
to manufacturers for product-related injuries. First, such
liability would lead manufacturers to invest in preventing
future product-related injuries. Second, tort liability,
resulting in the payment of compensatory damages to
injured consumers, would provide a form of insurance to the
injured that could be passed along in the product prices
paid by all consumers. The expansion of tort liability, thus,
would-like workers' compensation insurance-serve to
internalize injury costs to the firms that generated them. In
1944, however, Traynor's concurrence was only a
concurrence, and received little notice, though that would
later change.
These ideas-contract law is perverted by market
power, and tort law is a means of encouraging investments
in accident prevention and insurance for resulting losses-
transformed modern civil law. The first applications, again,
were in the products liability field. In 1960, in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court
marked the effective end of the relevance of contract law in
2006] 965
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defective product actions involving personal injury. 19 The
decision repudiates the basic principles of contract law
applicable to product defect cases. Henningsen involved an
action brought by the wife of the purchaser of a car, injured
when the car veered off the road without an adequate
explanation, though there was testimony suggesting a
mechanical defect. Even putting aside the privity of
contract problem, the automobile manufacturer's warranty
provided only for repair or replacement of any defective
part and disclaimed implied warranties that might extend
liability further to include personal injury damages. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the privity doctrine
and the express disclaimer of implied warranties were
invalid as a matter of law-quoting from and relying
heavily on Kessler's Contracts of Adhesion. According to the
Court, contract law should not be read to "authorize the
automobile manufacturer to use its grossly disproportionate
bargaining power to relieve itself from liability . . . . An
instinctively felt sense of justice cries out against such a
sharp bargain."20 The Court held that Mrs. Henningsen
could recover under the Court's interpretation of the
implied warranty of merchantability.
The permanent shift from contract to an expanded tort
law as the basis for the resolution of product defect claims
occurred in 1963 in the California Supreme Court decision
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 21 The case
involved personal injury from an allegedly defectively
designed machine tool.22 The manufacturer-defendant
believed that its strongest defense was the failure of the
victim to provide notice of the alleged breach of warranty
within a reasonable time. The strict notice requirement of
contract law, however, had been flagged as illustrative of
the outdated character of warranty law in many treatments
of the product defect question, including those by James
and a scholar writing in a similar vein, William Prosser. In
19. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
20. Id. at 95, 85.
21. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
22. Id. The product was a wood lathe in which a piece of wood being turned
had detached and injured the plaintiff. Id. The Court gave no attention as to
whether Mr. Greenman had fastened the piece of wood adequately prior to
turning on the lathe. Id.
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Greenman, it triggered the final acceptance by a majority of
the California Supreme Court of Traynor's strict liability
argument first presented nearly two decades earlier in
Escola.
In Greenman, Justice Traynor, writing for the Court,
announced the standard of strict liability in tort, applicable
to a manufacturer whenever "an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being. '23 The purpose of strict liability, according to
the Court, "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."24
For a further elaboration of justifications of strict liability,
the reader was referred to writings by James, and Prosser,
and to Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola.
Henningsen and Greenman were important moments in
the transformation of civil law. One further event, however,
vastly accelerated the transformation by jurisdictions
skittish of the cutting edge. In 1964, the American Law
Institute adopted Section 402A of its second Restatement of
Torts, extending strict liability to sellers of all products
defective and unreasonably dangerous without regard to
the seller's fault. The Reporter of the Restatement, William
Prosser, 25 represented to the Institute that sixteen separate
jurisdictions had adopted strict liability, or some standard
resembling it, citing forty different cases. This was blatant
exaggeration. A re-reading today shows that there were
only three cases actually supporting Prosser's
recommendation: Henningsen, Greenman, and a 1963 New
York decision, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.26 But
Prosser's recommendation was sufficient for the Institute,
and the Institute's adoption of the strict liability standard
was sufficient for the various states to adopt the standard
as well. Within a little more than a decade following the
23. Id. at 900.
24. Id. at 901.
25. James and Traynor, among others, were Advisers to Prosser on the
Restatement project.
26. 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963).
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Institute's adoption of the strict liability standard, forty-one
of the fifty jurisdictions had adopted the rule.
As mentioned, the change in the legal standards
regarding product liability was only an opening wedge-
though, surely, a significant wedge-in the more general
transformation of modern civil law. The broader
transformation of the law resulted from the extension of the
underlying ideas that had motivated the change in products
liability, first, to all other areas of civil law and, second,
conceptually by the acceptance of the proposition that civil
law could serve as a mechanism for regulating all risks
faced by the society.
First, although the strict liability standard itself has
been limited to the products field, the concept of cost
internalization that underlies it has been extended across
the various fields of civil law. Thus, the internalization
policy has been extended to justify awarding damages in
pollution cases, 27 in sexual harassment cases,28 and in false
arrest, malicious prosecution and Section 1983 civil rights
violation cases, 29 among others. In these various contexts,
as with product manufacture, it appears evident as to
which party costs should be internalized: the manufacturer
rather than the consumer, the polluter, the party harassing
the victim, and the official committing misconduct.
27. See, e.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 316
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("The costs of injuries resulting from pollution must be
internalized by industry as a cost of production and borne by consumers or
shareholders, or both, and not by the injured individual.").
28. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[G]oods produced by entrepreneurs who do not assume the costs of remedying
a tort (in this case sexism) are artificially cheap; forcing them to internalize the
costs of the tort regardless of fault eliminates incentives to be sexist and
ensures proper allocation of societal resources . . . ." (citing Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
500-07, 514-17(1961))).
29. See, e.g., Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 1983) ("If the
person contemplating an action will reap the benefits but will not pay the costs,
we have no assurance that the socially correct decision will be made .... Cost
internalization provides us with a mechanism for reaching the correct level of
deterrence for official misconduct. If people acting under color of state law know
that they will bear the consequences of their actions, they will be deterred from
violating a person's federal rights, but will not be over-deterred. The 'correct'
level of deterrence will be established.").
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The second extension of the concept involved its
application to contexts where it is less clear as to which
party costs should be internalized. In such contexts,
extension of the cost internalization concept requires
consideration of losses viewed as risks attending the
activity in question. Thus, all losses suffered in the society
represent the outcome of some probabilistic process. The
actions of one party or another can be viewed as
contributing to the probability of occurrence of a loss,
arrayed upon a continuum from losses the probability of
which is one hundred percent-intentionally caused
harms-to losses the probability of which is zero.
With this extension, the basic foundation of civil law is
transformed into controlling risks through cost
internalization. The question before the court becomes
which party to the litigation is in the best position to control
the risk of loss. Again, in many contexts-such as product
manufacture-it may seem obvious which party is in the
superior position to control risks.30 In other contexts,
however, determining which party is in the superior
position to bear the risk of loss from the activity is more
complicated and requires a seemingly more sophisticated
analysis of the relative abilities of the parties before the
court to prevent or to bear those risks.
The adoption of risk control as the central purpose of
civil law shifts sharply the focus of legal controversy in each
of its various subfields. In the field of contract law, for
example, only a few decades ago, contract litigation turned
chiefly on differing interpretations, in terms of standard
English, of the provisions of underlying written contracts.
In modern contract litigation, in contrast, the issues have
been completely reoriented around the question of risk. The
fact that some change in underlying conditions led one of
the parties to breach the contract is only the beginning of
the inquiry. The issue before the court is which party
should bear the risk of the change in conditions that
impelled the breach. Today, courts summon sophisticated
theories of economics and risk bearing to determine
whether it is more consistent with the long-term interests
30. In fact, from an economic point of view, this conclusion-though
embraced in modern civil law-is not so obvious. See generally George L. Priest,
The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 31 (1991).
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of the parties to assign the risk of the specific change of
conditions that animated the breach to the breaching party
or to the victim of the breach itself.
Similarly, in earlier years, the law of corporations and
of mergers and acquisitions was defined almost exclusively
by the terms of corporate documents. Today, the papers of
incorporation are often treated only as other obstacles that
must be surpassed as part of the analysis of how to allocate
risks that affect corporate ownership and structure. In
recent highly publicized litigation involving mergers and
acquisitions, for example, the issue before the court is
whether the market for corporate control will be facilitated
by assigning the risk and the commensurate benefits of
some novel method of hostile takeover to the current
shareholders, to the current management, or to the
corporate raiders who have initiated the struggle.
The development of risk control as the central function
of civil law has been most prominent in fields involving
personal injury. As in other fields, this development led to
an extensive redefinition of legal issues. In cases involving
claims of medical malpractice, for example, modern
litigation extends far beyond the earlier, relatively simple
inquiry into whether a doctor was morally culpable for
breaching standards of community practice. In the most
sophisticated malpractice litigation today, the issue is one
of risk and its control: did the attending surgeon have
sufficient control over the determinants of the risk of the
medical maloccurrence to justify liability, should that risk
be assigned to the supporting physicians, or to the
hospital-vicariously-through a judgment against its
staff?
An important implication of the adoption of risk control
as the principal function of civil law is that issues of motive
and volition central to the legal regime that prevailed until
the 1960s are rendered largely irrelevant. In modern
contract law, for example, the decision of a party to
intentionally breach a contract has little legal significance.
It is acknowledged that the risks are omnipresent, that
changes in conditions will occur that might unsettle
contracts and, that thus, it is inevitable that some contracts
will be breached. The role of a court, as a result, is no longer
to punish the breach of contract, but to allocate between the
parties the risks of such changes in underlying conditions.
Though in earlier years it was necessary to demonstrate
970 [Vol. 54
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that a manufacturer had acted with bad motives or had
behaved recklessly or negligently, today such issues are
largely ignored. The concern of the courts today extends
beyond specific bad motives to the broader risks of product
injury. Thus, a manufacturer may have organized its
production process with deep humanitarian concern for the
welfare of its consumers, but if the company has
miscalculated the risks and benefits of safety design,
liability will follow immediately.
Many believe the derogation of issues of motive and
volition in civil law as indicating a decline in commitment
to individual responsibility or, perhaps, a shift of
expectations toward an impersonal or a collective
responsibility. The shift in standards of law may indirectly
have that effect as citizens revise their expectations of the
ultimate consequences of misoccurrences that afflict them.
But the stimulus for the shift toward risk control as the
central purpose of civil law is different and did not derive
from a diminished conviction of the importance of
individual responsibility.
The legal regime that prevailed from the nineteenth
century through the mid-1960s functioned chiefly by
categorizing certain actions that generated loss as so
particularly extreme or egregious as to deserve liability for
any harm that resulted. Actions subject to legal liability
were those for which there was a dramatically greater than
normal chance that loss would result. According to this
regime, prototypical candidates for liability were harms
caused intentionally and those close to the intentional
because of the high likelihood of injury.
Resolving disputes according to the standards of risk
control is entirely different and implies vastly different
methods of legal analysis. A property law whose focus is
boundary disputes, a contract law whose focus is breach of
promise, and a personal injury law whose focus is serious
moral dereliction are each regimes in which the law defines
a clear demarcation between acts subject to liability and
acts immune from it. If the property line is transgressed, a
trespass action will follow. If the contract is not performed,
or if the injurer is morally culpable, damages will follow.
According to this earlier conception of the role of civil
law, there are certain clear actions for which liability will
apply, but equally clear sets for which liability is
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unavailable. Indeed, there are large sets of injuries suffered
by property owners, parties to contracts, and injured
victims that not only do not justify liability, but do not even
justify judicial scrutiny. For example, under such a regime,
a consumer who is injured by a product but cannot show
that the product was intentionally or recklessly mis-
manufactured, or cannot show clear moral negligence in the
manufacturing process, cannot recover damages. From the
standpoint of the law, the product-related injury remains
one of life's hazards to be suffered as best as possible
according to the victim's resources, but without reference to
the legal system. As another example, if a farmer promised
to provide a broker 1,000 bushels of corn, but because of
drought can only provide 500, the farmer has breached the
contract and must pay damages to the broker for the
remainder. According to the law, the farmer must suffer the
loss because it was the farmer, not the broker, who
promised to deliver the corn.
This is not to suggest that the earlier regime was
totally indifferent to conditions generating losses. If the
probability of injury from product use were exceptionally
high, the law could conclude that the manufacturer should
have known of the product danger and find the
manufacturer liable, despite its claim of ignorance.
Similarly, if the drought itself were so extreme that it
prevented the farmer from delivering any of the 1,000
bushels, the law could relieve the farmer by rescinding the
contract, finding it impossible to perform. Nevertheless, the
method of analysis under the regime, even in these
examples, was one of comparing the extremity of the factual
context of the loss to some standard of normal or expected
behavior.
According to this approach, some actions differ so
dramatically from the normal-reckless manufacture or
breach of contract-that legal liability is justified. Legal
analysis under such a regime consisted of categorizing acts
as either qualifying as sufficiently abnormal to justify
liability, or not. Obviously, intentional harm-causing
actions justified liability. Beyond the intentional, unusually
egregious actions may have justified liability. In almost all
other cases, however, liability was unavailable, and the law
allowed the loss to lie where it had fallen.
The adoption of risk control as the central goal of civil
law rejects this categorical method of legal analysis. A law
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concerned with risk perceives losses as occurring
probabilistically, with greater or lesser likelihood. Actions
become subject to potential legal liability if they increase
the occurrence of loss by some sufficient amount.
This shift does not reject, but builds upon, the liability
imposed by the previous regime. Losses caused
intentionally, or that are especially egregious, remain
subject to liability a fortiori. The frontier of liability,
instead, is extended to disputes involving actions that
increase the probability of loss by some dimension, though
they may not make the loss inevitable or even highly likely.
Thus, a manufacturer is made responsible for avoiding
more than recklessly or egregiously negligent production
methods; the manufacturer must monitor all potential
sources of product risk and will be held liable whenever a
risk eventuates that the manufacturer could readily have
controlled. Thus, manufacturers of automobiles are
routinely held liable for failing to design safety features in
autos that would protect even drunk drivers from injuries
resulting from the accidents they cause.
Similarly, liability for breach of contract induced by a
drought will turn not on the simple issue of whether it was
the farmer or the broker who breached the promise. Rather,
the breach of promise is viewed as a probabilistic outcome
of the drought. The issue in the case shifts to the question
of the appropriate assignment of the risk of drought: is it
better to allocate the risk of drought to the individual
farmer, locked into the specific climatic position of the farm,
or to the broker, who can diversify drought risk by entering
contracts with geographically disparate farmers?
A law concerned with risk control rejects a discrete
demarcation between actions regarded as extreme and
those regarded as normal. All actions can be arrayed on a
continuum of contribution toward loss. Thus, central
concepts of causation are altered dramatically. The earlier
regime that imposed a sharp distinction between
particularly extreme sources of harm versus all others was
necessarily committed to a very strict conception of
causation. Actions were subject to liability for causing harm
chiefly if they constituted the sole or exclusive source of the
harm. In contrast, our modern civil law, devoted to risk
control, focuses less upon strict causation than upon
contribution to the occurrence of the harm. Some action
may generate liability because of its contribution to the risk
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of occurrence, though it was only one of the many
simultaneously contributing sources of the loss.
The new regime of risk control thus vastly expands the
opportunity for the attachment of legal liability, as well as
the importance of civil law as an instrument of social
control. Many decry what they perceive as the increased
litigiousness of modern society, but the level of litigiousness
is only a function of the underlying legal rules in force. Our
modern civil law encourages litigation as an instrument for
internalizing costs to control risks. In our society, inten-
tionally or egregiously caused harms are infrequent;
therefore, the earlier legal regime that focused only upon
such harms was a regime of very limited scope. In contrast,
our modern legal regime, focused upon every contribution to
risk, is a regime of dramatically greater dimension. Such a
regime aspires to impose legal controls on all activities in
the society that contribute to risk in any way. Thus,
virtually every action by every citizen becomes subject to
potential legal review because every action will increase the
risk of some loss in some way.
To my mind, far from incorporating a diminished view
of individual responsibility, the shift of the law's purpose
toward risk control represents a vastly expanded
commitment to standards of individual liability, though
expanded liability is somewhat different than enhanced
individual responsibility. Under the new regime, an
individual may be held liable not only for intentionally or
maliciously harmful behavior, but for all behavior that
increases the risk of loss, though the loss itself may be
remote. Under earlier law, an individual needed to make
certain only that his or her actions caused no direct injury
to another individual. Under modern law, in contrast, an
individual must make certain that his or her actions do not
increase the risk of loss in any way. Thus, for each citizen,
the potential of civil liability is vastly increased. The law
charges each citizen to carefully monitor every action for its
potential contribution to risk of loss.
From the standpoint of the control of risk, it is difficult
to define a truly solitary act-an act that does not in some
way implicate risks to others. The gardener spraying plants
or the recluse reading silently before the fireplace may not
be subject to personal liability for the increase in the
collective social risk from pesticides or particulates, but will
suffer the attachment of liability as pesticide or firewood
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prices rise or as the society proscribes such enjoyments
directly. It is equally difficult in a society concerned with
risk to truly shield or isolate oneself from others. The
gardener's yield will be affected by the acidity of the rain,
just as book prices will reflect the shift to acid-free paper.
The centrality of risk effectively prevents all efforts of social
escape.
Beyond increasing the scope of individual
responsibility, the regime of risk control dramatically
changes the substantive content of that responsibility. The
focus of modern law on risk control diminishes the
importance of moral standards in the evaluation of harm-
causing activities. It is no longer useful in such a regime to
distinguish between the guilty and the innocent or the
culpable and the blameless. Almost every human action will
increase the probability of some loss by some amount;
empirically, it would be extremely rare for an action to
contribute zero toward the probability of occurrence of all
losses in all contexts. It follows, therefore, that under the
modern conception of risk, no action is ever truly innocent.
Each of us must recognize that all of our actions are likely
to harm others in the society in some way. As a
consequence, every citizen stands in a position of
continuous potential interaction with the law because every
action is potentially subject to liability. Indeed, each of us
must be aware that many of our specific actions may well
lie close to the point on the risk continuum at which the
attachment of legal liability becomes socially worthwhile.
Once it is accepted that all actions can be arrayed at
some point upon the risk-contribution continuum, sharp
moral distinctions lose moment. It is no longer possible to
clearly separate the moral quality of one's personal actions
from the quality of the actions of others. On the risk-
contribution continuum, there are no clear qualitative
differences between actions whatsoever; all actions
contribute something to risk. The only question is the
extent of the contribution.
The decline in the importance of moral standards as
grounds for comparing loss-contributing actions, however,
should not be interpreted to suggest that our new legal
regime of risk control lacks moral foundation. The moral
foundation of the new regime is relentlessly utilitarian. The
objective of controlling risk as effectively as possible
prevails over all else. Civil law serves to internalize costs,
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first, to create incentives to reduce the risk level as much as
is practicable placing liability on that party in the relatively
better position to prevent it. Second, if the injury could not
have been practicably prevented, liability will be placed on
that party in the relatively better position to spread the
risks of the injury as if an insurer.
The adoption of these two utilitarian principles of risk
control has subtly changed the nature of modern
adjudication. Modern trials have been transformed from
disputes between individuals to occasions for judicial social
engineering. In earlier days, the function of adjudication
was to resolve specific controversies between often
embittered parties. In such cases, the particular moral
qualities of the parties or of their actions were of central
importance, as issues of motive and goodwill were crucial.
In modern litigation, in contrast, the court must evaluate
not how one individual or another behaved in a moment of
crisis, but whether one party or another, as representatives
of generic categories of actors, was in a better position to
prevent injuries or to spread the costs of them. In litigation
of this nature, the qualities of the actual litigants become
irrelevant because the issue before the court is how best to
fashion incentives for parties in such positions in the
future. An obstetrician and a nurse-midwife may have
dedicated their lives to serving others. In the incident
before the court, they may have exerted great effort to help
the injured child and suffered as deeply as the parents over
the subsequent injury. But if the court determines that the
risk of injury was within their control, that it was affected
in any way by some technical decision made or ignored, or
that the two professionals or their insurers were in the best
position to spread such injury costs, liability for a lifetime of
losses may be placed upon them.
In modern adjudication, the dispute between the
specific litigants is of secondary, even trivial, importance to
the exercise. The concern of the courts is how to best
fashion broader incentives to maximize social welfare. The
parties themselves and the loss that one of them has
suffered become mere informational inputs to the process of
judicial revision of controlling rules of law. The legal claim
serves only as an empirical example of a social problem for
which a more specific legal rule defining appropriate
behavior is needed. Frequently, in modern litigation, the
parties are unwitting instruments of this broader judicial
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purpose. But increasingly in recent years, the adversarial
character of litigation has become pretended rather than
real. The requirements of procedure compel the parties to
defend contesting positions. Yet, often the litigants and
their attorneys play out their roles, not as hostile
adversaries, but as characters, knowing that the drama
being staged serves only to determine which of their
insurers should foot the bill.
The new purpose of the law has led courts to adopt
many novel and interesting rules that seem bizarre from
the vantage point of earlier years. An example is the 1982
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., a relatively early case in
the transformation of civil law. 31 The case involved a claim
by a worker that an asbestos manufacturer should be held
liable for damages because the manufacturer had failed to
warn the worker that asbestos could cause cancer. The
manufacturer sought to defend the claim by proving that, at
the time the worker contracted cancer, it was not known,
and could not have been known, scientifically, that asbestos
causes cancer. More perceptive of the contours of our
modern regime, the plaintiffs challenged the defense as
irrelevant as a matter of law. The court concurred, holding
that the manufacturer was liable for breaching its duty to
warn the worker that asbestos causes cancer though the
court accepted that, at the time of the breach, it was
impossible, scientifically, to have known that asbestos
causes cancer.
The notion of liability for breach of a duty with which it
is impossible to comply seems to strain the most basic
notions of responsibility. But responsibility in a regime of
risk control has a very unusual meaning. According to the
Court, the manufacturer should be liable for the loss for two
reasons. First, the decision improved incentives for accident
avoidance: "By imposing on manufacturers the costs of
failure to discover hazards, we create an incentive for them
to invest more actively in safety research."32 Second,
regardless of the information available at the time of injury,
holding the manufacturer liable will serve to distribute the
risks of product injuries broadly, because manufacturers
31. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
32. 447 A.2d at 548.
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can include expected injury costs in the prices of their
products. Responsibility under the regime of risk control,
thus, can mean a responsibility imposed ex post facto to
reduce or to spread the risks of injuries. 33
Many disapprove of the contours of modern civil law.
But can those contours be changed? In my judgment, it is
fanciful to imagine a return to the categorical analysis of
civil law that prevailed until the 1960s. In retrospect, that
legal regime was simplistic. There is a probabilistic
character to all societal losses. All societal activities do
implicate risks that some individuals will be harmed in
some way.
The concept of internalizing costs to address those
losses, however, can be substantially sharpened. As
suggested earlier, Ronald Coase explained-now forty years
ago-that with respect to activity levels, injury costs are
always internalized. Civil law is not needed to achieve the
economic effect. 34 The question that remains is whether and
how aggregate social welfare can be enhanced by shifting
injury costs, which is to say, by changing the method of cost
internalization.
Many have shown that employing civil law to provide
insurance is counterproductive. Civil law may continue to
possess a role, however, in creating incentives to directly
reduce accident rates. Perhaps oddly, despite over forty
years of experience with the expanded liability created by
modern civil law, there are no empirical studies that have
demonstrated that the expansion of liability has reduced
the level of harm. Of course, there are strong market forces
that generate greater levels of safety. No one has been able
to show that legal liability serves to increase safety further.
Still, it remains possible that expanded liability
enhances safety, and thus civil law can serve a regulatory
33. The Beshada opinion generated substantial criticism, and the New
Jersey Supreme Court limited its scope to asbestos cases in Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). Several other jurisdictions, however, have
adopted the approach.
34. Although Coase's article is widely known and universally accepted, this
point remains not fully understood even among economists. See, e.g., Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980), discussed
in George L. Priest, Internalizing Costs passim (Jan. 19, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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role. It is an entirely separate question whether that
regulation is sensibly administered through our adversarial
process with the final decision delegated to lay juries,
selected intentionally because their members know nothing
about the subject before them. Put differently, we cannot
imagine a regulatory agency such as, say, NHTSA, setting
standards for auto safety based upon the presentation of a
claim by a single seriously injured individual with respect
to that person's single accident, delegating the ultimate
decision to laypersons.
Our modern regime of civil law, nevertheless, remains
deeply entrenched both in terms of economic interests-
note the to-date successful efforts of the trial bar and the
unions to thwart the rejection of civil law with respect to
asbestos-related injuries-and in popular conception. To
change that legal regime in a serious way will require a
substantial demonstration of the harms that it causes.

